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GuERRA y WELFARE STATE: EL CASO DE iTALiA, 
DE LA 1.ª GuERRA MuNDiAL AL FASCiSMO
Ilaria Pavan*
Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa (Italia)
abstract: On the eve of WWI Italy was among the less advanced European countries in terms 
of social policies. This was due both to the the frailty of the state building process, began in 1860, 
and to the relative weakness of the workers’ organizations. In accordance with recent literature that 
shows the manifold causal links between the developments of the welfare state and war, this arti-
cle aims at examining the peculiarities of the Italian scenario. Faced with the new social needs tri-
ggered by the total war, Italian governments experienced an unprecedented activism in the field 
of social policies, especially in the last year of the conflict and in the immediate post-war period. 
This was a radical evolution with respect of the pre-war context. By analyzing the various measu-
res adopted, and the rethoric that justified and surrounded them, this paper shows how WWI can be 
considered as the real starting point in the history of the Italian welfare state. 
KEYWORDS: Italy, WWI, social insurances, soldiers, reforms
resumen: Antes del inicio de la Primera Guerra Mundial, italia se encontraba entre los paí-
ses europeos menos avanzados en términos de políticas sociales. Esto se debió tanto a la fragili-
dad del proceso de construcción del Estado, que comenzó en 1860, como a la debilidad relativa de 
las organizaciones de trabajadores. Atendiendo a líneas de acercamiento recientes que muestra los 
múltiples vínculos causales entre los desarrollos del Estado de Bienestar y la guerra, este artículo 
pretende examinar las peculiaridades del escenario italiano. Enfrentados a las nuevas necesidades 
sociales provocadas por la guerra total, los gobiernos italianos experimentaron una actividad sin 
precedentes en el campo de las políticas sociales, especialmente en el último año del conflicto y en 
el período inmediato de posguerra, lo que supuso una evolución radical con respecto al contexto 
de preguerra. Al analizar las diversas medidas adoptadas, y la retórica que las justificaba y ro-
deaba, este texto muestra cómo la Primera Guerra Mundial puede considerarse como el verdadero 
punto de arranque en la construcción del Welfare State italiano.
PALABRAS CLAVE: italia, 1.ª Guerra Mundial, Seguros Sociales, soldados, reformas.
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Wars have long constituted a gray zone in the history of the welfare 
state; the question of the origins and development of social protection 
systems has primarily been viewed in relation to processes of moderni-
zation, or as an instrument for managing social conflict. As some have 
noted, in mainstream comparative welfare-state literature “war is typically 
considered a rare, anomalous contingency conceptualized as an exoge-
nous shock, an ‘abnormal event,’ a ‘black swan’ emergency or a critical 
juncture.”1 War has therefore tended to fall outside the scope of research 
preferred by historians and social scientists, who are interested in tracing 
general laws and models of welfare-state development and more inclined 
to hypothesize a “sharp trade-off between guns and butter and a negative 
impact of military conflict on social protection.”2 
A recent literature has instead highlighted the existence of a clear 
causal link between wars—particularly the total wars of the twentieth cen-
tury—and the development of modern social protection systems in many 
contexts both inside and outside of Europe,3 emphasizing how the two 
world wars were “a crucial catalyst for the creation of the modern welfare 
state.”4 The welfare-warfare link has also been examined in relation to 
processes promoting social equality and forms of distributive equity, not 
only through the introduction of a more ramified social legislation, but 
through reforms in the structure of national fiscal systems that were un-
dertaken due to wartime contingencies.5
In recent years, Italian historiography has also begun to approach the 
analysis of welfare-state development from the angle of war.6 With a fo-
cus almost exclusively on World War I, some individual fields have be-
gun to be explored, particularly with regard to the condition of veterans 
1 Obinger, Petersen, 2017, p. 203
2 Obinger, Petersen, 2017, p. 204. One exception is the case of the United Kingdom, 
given that studies immediately connected the development of the Beveridge Plan, and the 
subsequent social measures introduced by the Labor governments, to the contingencies of 
World War II.
3 See especially Obinger, Petersen, Starke, 2018; Moses, 2018, pp. 212-270; Obinger, 
Petersen, 2017; Scheidel, 2017; Castle, 2010; Gal, 2007; Revue d’histoire de la protection 
sociale, 9, 2016, n. 1, special issue “Grande Guerre e protection social”; Klausen, 1998.
4 Scheidel 2017, p. 53. 
5 Steve, Stasavage, 2017.
6 There are several studies of the overall evolution of the Italian welfare state (see es-
pecially Cherubini 1977; Silei 2003). But although they cover the period of World War I, 
they have not focused on the connections between this conflict and developments in wel-
fare.
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and the disabled.7 But no assessment of the results achieved in Italy by 
government welfare policies between the war and the period immediately 
after it has yet been presented, nor have certain unique aspects of the Ital-
ian scene been looked at in comparison with other national contexts.8 
It is common knowledge that Italy entered the war with only a patchy, 
hazy social protection system: it was geared (in a very biased way) only 
toward industrial workers, had many obvious gaps, especially in the field 
of healthcare and assistance, and there was a clear lack of state commit-
ment to funding welfare measures. On the eve of the war, only 4.8% of 
the population was covered by some form of social protection (compared 
to 42.8% in Germany and 36.3% in Great Britain)9 and only a paltry 
1.56% of overall government spending was allocated to welfare in 1914.10 
The country was thus clearly lagging behind the rest of Europe. If this 
was the starting point in Italy, how incisive and lasting were the new poli-
cies regarding social insurance and assistance that were set in motion by 
the conflict? What political outlooks and what kinds of expertise did they 
reflect? How did the last few fragile Liberal administrations handle the 
complex phase of postwar transition? What situation was bequeathed to 
the new Fascist government? 
Moving through the vast labyrinth of laws passed during the war 
(some 337 measures tied in some way to the social sphere had been is-
sued in Italy by October 1919)11 can be disorienting. The provisions range 
from old-age pensions to accident insurance, from life insurance policies 
for soldiers to relief payments for families, from job placement for the 
disabled to unemployment benefits, from aid to widows and orphans all 
the way to social housing projects. This web of initiatives must be exam-
ined as a whole, because they were complementary. Since they were of-
ten introduced by decree, and thus lacked the useful framework of parlia-
mentary discussion and debate, any attempt at a detailed reconstruction 
7 Bracco, 2012; Procacci, 2013; Pironti, 2015; Salvante 2105; Rapini, 2016; Quaglia-
roli, 2016; Pavan Della Torre, 2016; Labanca, 2016; Ferrera-vergallo, 2018; Quagliaroli, 
2018; Masina 2018. 
8 In comparative studies (Köhler-zacher, 1982; Wall-Winter, 1988; Winter-Robert 
1997-2007; Bonzon 2003 Italy has not been among the cases analyzed. The only exception 
is Obinger, Petersen, Starke, 2018. 
9 Alber, 1983, p. 220. 
10 Luzzati, Portesi 1984, p. 123.
11 For a chronological list of measures, see Ministero per l’Assistenza Militare e le 
Pensioni di guerra, 1919, pp. 91–116. 
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of their authorship, aims, and evolution runs up against undeniable obsta-
cles. The incomplete, scattered nature of the sources, which stems in part 
from the fact that in Italy, the management of social assistance and insur-
ance was divided up among many different institutions (and that the coun-
try had no Ministry of Labor and Welfare until June 1920), does not make 
it easy for scholars to approach a subject like the history of welfare, which 
necessarily involves juggling multiple perspectives and areas of expertise. 
Without pretending to be systematic, this article will offer an over-
view of the main welfare measures introduced by Italian governments 
during World War I and during the difficult months of demobilization 
after the war, and thus will look at the initiatives backed by political 
and institutional forces. It will highlight the undeniable scope of the at-
tempted reform, and how it marked a clear break with the timid social 
policies of previous decades. This break was visible in its guiding princi-
ples and in its institutions, but also in the vocabulary employed, and ref-
erences to new rights of citizenship crop up in the words of leading fig-
ures of that era. It will also point out the contradictions and weaknesses 
of the initiative, which became more pronounced under the last few Lib-
eral administrations. At the end of 1922, these deficiencies, which can be 
seen above all in measures that were planned but never carried out (such 
as those regarding health insurance or tax reform), left the new Fascist 
government with a social protection system that had certainly been rede-
signed in comparison to the pre-war system, and in some ways mirrored 
coeval programs around Europe, but which in other spheres—health in-
surance, in particular—still reflected incomplete, inadequate visions and 
institutions. 
1. “a war of ideas”: assistance and insurance for a nation at arms
In October 1919, in their introduction to a volume titled L’assistenza 
di guerra in italia12 (Wartime Assistance in Italy), two anonymous bu-
reaucrats at the Ministry of Military Assistance and War Pensions called 
the work of this recently founded ministry—established by a decree of the 
Boselli administration on November 1, 1917, and entrusted to the direc-
tion of the Reformist Socialist Leonida Bissolati—one of the most signifi-
12 Ministero per l’Assistenza Militare, 1919.
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cant institutional innovations to have emerged from the war. Even the two 
bureaucrats overseeing the publication of this commemorative volume 
could see that it marked a clear intensification of the government’s role in 
the field of welfare.
This war has also been a war of ideas; out of its miseries and dis-
asters, a shining path has been charted for the goals of the state [...] It 
has laid the foundations for us to build a noble edifice of human fel-
lowship.13 
Founded, not coincidentally, just a few days after the Italian army’s 
defeat at Caporetto—hence with the clear purpose of helping to control an 
ever more volatile home front—the new ministry nevertheless constituted 
a clear leap in the forms and scope of assistance that the state decided to 
provide to its citizens. Underscoring how the war had caught Italy “with-
out the desirable Ministry of Social Assistance and Insurance that had al-
ready been created in almost all other nations,”14 the officials hoped that 
the new institution would be the first step towards a Ministry of Govern-
ment Assistance, period. Upon leaving the helm of the ministry in Decem-
ber 1918, Minister Bissolati wrote:
Your work is far from over. There are still far too many who are 
entitled to assistance for reasons connected to the war, and are still 
awaiting individual acknowledgment of these rights; in addition, there 
are all those whom recent events have called on to make new and 
greater concessions. This in itself is a considerable task: but there is 
more to be done. So I express the strong hope, and consider it well-
grounded, that the temporary function of military assistance will offer 
firm foundations for erecting a Ministry of Government Assistance, 
which would bring together the existing institutions that oversee pen-
sions and insurance. This would constitute the loftiest kind of social 
initiative for a democracy and, since it would merge and coordinate 
pre-existing institutions, would be a reform that streamlines the task 
of administration.15
13 ibid., 1919, p. vI and vII. This volume was presented at the Third Inter-Allied Con-
ference for the Protection of Disabled veterans, held in Rome in October 1919.
14 ibid., 1919, p. 15
15 ibid., 1919, p. 31.
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Until a Ministry of Government Assistance could be founded, the 
Ministry of Military Assistance would see to “coordinating the various 
services handled by some seven state agencies and guiding them in a sin-
gle direction”16: words that hint at the problem—a long-term issue in the 
history of the Italian welfare state—of the overlapping roles parceled out 
among many different institutions, which were often territorial about their 
expertise, autonomy in decision-making, and funding.
The ministry’s task was to pay out pensions to veterans, offer support 
to the families of those serving, wounded, or killed, provide assistance to 
the injured and disabled, in other words, oversee “all forms of assistance 
benefitting all those affected by the war.”17 This emphasis on the word 
“all” implicitly acknowledges that the total mobilization generated by the 
conflict meant that the ministry’s function went beyond support for sol-
diers. For instance, transferable war pensions also ended up going to their 
wives, widows, children, and parents, and within the still hazy landscape 
of Italian assistance and insurance, they took on a quality that—to stretch 
the term a bit—could perhaps be called proto-universalist. 
Another extremely significant aspect was the introduction of an ex-
panded definition of “family,” as regarded the beneficiaries of the new in-
surance and assistance programs. In a major break with the framework of 
family law laid out by the Liberal civil code of 1865, Decree no. 1726 of 
October 27, 1918 (which overhauled the entire war pension system) made 
decisive changes to indirect benefits.18 Embracing a distinctly modern, 
secular conception of family ties in which, for the first time, no distinc-
tions were made between the rights of married and unmarried couples, the 
decree expanded the scope of aid granted to former combatants and their 
relatives. As the aforecited volume published by the Ministry of Military 
Assistance explained, “Putting aside old legal traditions and prejudices, 
family relationships are considered with a modern breadth of outlook and, 
one might say, almost purely by the yardstick of natural law.”19 Pension 
laws now incorporated the concept of a person “equivalent to a widow,” 
giving a cohabiting partner or a fiancée the same rights as a spouse, and 
16 Ministero per l’Assistenza Militare, 1919, p. 28. Bissolati’s resignation was moti-
vated by serious conflicts with Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino.
17 ibid, 1919, p. 26. The emphasis is in the original.
18 The regulations regarding the transferability of pensions to “needy parents” led, for 
example, to the payment of 47,000 new benefit checks in the five years that followed.
19 Ministero per l’Assistenza Militare, 1919, p. 27.
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making it possible for a pension to be transferred to such survivors based 
only on a verbal declaration by the soldier in the presence of two wit-
nesses. Likewise, natural children whose paternity had been recognized 
were given equal status to legitimate offspring. A few weeks after its in-
troduction, the measure was described by the undersecretary of the Minis-
try of Military Assistance, the Liberal Democrat Mario Cermenati: 
Having granted due consideration to public attitudes in this stage 
of our civilization, and lovingly examined the living conditions of our 
people, lawmakers have come to believe that the sphere of emotional 
and economic relationships revolving around the domestic hearth is 
not limited to the one described by the Civil Code; that in addition to 
the legitimate family, there are de facto families based on sexual un-
ion and the resulting ties of kinship [...]. The tears shed by these unof-
ficial families are no less anguished and heartfelt then those of a fam-
ily by law.20
The decree establishing equal rights for de facto families was pre-
ceded, in April 1918, by an analogous provision regarding per-diem ben-
efit payments for combatants and their families. Sponsored once again by 
the Ministry of Military Assistance, which had taken on the role of wel-
fare management, the provision was introduced through a tool much less 
official than a decree, an ordinary ministerial circular:
 “ILLEGITIMATE FAMILIES: [...] There are members of the mili-
tary currently in service who, although they have not, for various rea-
sons, entered into a legal bond of matrimony with the woman they love, 
have created a true de facto family union with her, often strengthened 
by the birth of children [...] In the case of such unions, the Ministry has 
determined that per-diem support is to be granted.21.
While the measures on behalf of military families granted women 
“only a mediated form of social citizenship through the head-of-house-
20 Cermenati, 1918, p. 289.
21 Circular no. 40 of the Ministry of Military Assistance, April 22, 1918. The grant-
ing of benefits to families was overseen by municipal and provincial commissions set up 
for the purpose, but at present little is known about how they operated. See Crocella, Maz-
zonis, 2002, p. 894. According to a volume published in 1930 in the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace’s Italian series, not more than 63% of those entitled to them re-
ceived cash benefits; see Serpieri 1930, p. 225.
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hold, fostering a gendered system of social insurance in future welfare 
states,”22 in Italy this inclusion of de-facto families nevertheless marked 
a clear break in with the Catholic, bourgeois conception of the fam-
ily, and a significant rent in the sturdy fence that civil law had erected 
around it. And it is no coincidence that the Fascist government, as early 
as 1923, hastened to do away with this specific reform in the war pen-
sion law. 
The broader new forms of support to men in the trenches and their 
families that the Orlando administration introduced, especially through 
the Treasury Ministry and the Ministry of Military Assistance, were not 
meant to encourage dependency, however. With a tone and emphasis that 
reveals elements of the productivity-focused, technocratic outlook that 
characterized Francesco Saverio Nitti, who was Treasury Minister at the 
time, it was emphasized that “aid, while aiming to lift the needy out of 
poverty, must primarily be geared to providing them with the means to 
work and become independent: every act of social insurance must, if pos-
sible, also be an act of production.”23 And one can see a similar attitude 
in other important benefits introduced for soldiers, officers, and their fam-
ilies, which not coincidentally, came about through the efforts of Treas-
ury Minister Nitti. These were free life insurance policies for combatants, 
also introduced shortly after Caporetto, in December 1917,24 and abun-
dantly advertised through trench newspapers. Initially envisioned only for 
enlisted men, they were extended a few months later to officers,25 as well 
as to natural and legitimate children and to parents.26 The policies, issued 
by the Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni (INA – National Insurance 
Institute), could be taken out free of charge since the cost was entirely 
covered by the state, making them unlike any other measure in Europe at 
the time. By May 1918, 480,000 policies had been issued, and an internal 
memo from the directors of the INA suggests that the initiative was enthu-
siastically received:
22 Thébaud, 2003, p. 79. 
23 Ministero per l’Assistenza Militare, 1919, p. 92. The italics are in the original.
24 Introduced with Decree no. 1970 of December 10, 1917. These policies guaranteed 
a fixed amount to be paid upon the death of the insured soldier or at their thirty-year matu-
rity. 
25 Decree no. 374 of March 7, 1918.
26 Decree no. 1953 of December 8, 1918. 
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It is very interesting to read the letters that are coming in from 
families and from soldiers themselves at the front. The social goals 
pursued by the government with the introduction of these policies 
have been clearly grasped both by the army and by the civilian popu-
lation.27
In Nitti’s view, but also in the eyes of Alberto Beneduce and Bon-
aldo Stringher, who were respectively CEO and president of the INA at 
the time, the policies were not meant to merely be a tool of aid or support, 
but an “act of production,” since the decree envisioned that they could be 
cashed in even three months after discharge, “on the condition that their 
value be reinvested in tools of labor and productivity.” Due to the delayed 
growth of private insurance in Italy compared to other European coun-
tries, this life insurance initiative was part of an attempt, already under-
taken before the war by the INA leadership, to spread the idea of insur-
ance and personal savings to ever broader sectors of the public.
As in the case of war pensions, this tool designed to provide soldiers 
and their families with an insurance-based form of support not only broke 
with the classic, rigid Liberal framework of family law, but with the idea of 
family in itself, since it, too, allowed partners, illegitimate children, or even 
“old friends” to be named as beneficiaries in the event of the bearer’s death. 
Terms such as “heart” and “sentiments”—definitely not ordinary language 
for bureaucrats—cropped up in official statements. Nitti wrote:
Every soldier in the trenches, on the front lines, or in any part of 
our land is entitled to write in the name of someone dear to him, be it 
a brother, wife or lover, mother or illegitimate child, or an old friend, 
or a far-off person who in some way is close to his heart, and he may 
do as he likes with the sum that the state puts at the disposal of its 
combatants.28.
27 Undated note, presumably from the late spring of 1918, in Archivio Centrale dello 
Stato (ACS), Carte Nitti, b. 19, f. 49. The INA’s propaganda campaign—one can glean 
from the note—had been massive: two million policies had already been sent to the front, 
and INA officials were dispatched to hold talks explaining how they worked and pass out 
publicity material. 
28 This quotation from Nitti, for which the original source cannot be traced, can be 
found in the documents made available online by the historical archive of the INA; see 
http://www.alleanza.it/Chi-siamo/La-storia/Il-conflitto-e-la-ripresa/Polizze-combattenti/ 
(last accessed August 28, 2018).
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And General Armando Diaz29, in a telegram addressed to the troops 
meant to publicize the distribution of policies at the front (where they 
were actually signed), reminded them that enlisted men and officers could 
freely choose would was to receive these sums in the event of their death, 
“even without regard for the civil code, allocating them as they see fit ac-
cording to the pledges made in their hearts and sentiments.”30.
The discussion and reform of war pensions and the introduction of free 
life insurance for combatants showed the strategic importance and driving 
role that the exigencies of mass mobilization played in promoting and ac-
celerating new forms of social protection.31 Nevertheless, the attempt to 
transform and expand welfare through the creation of the new Ministry of 
Military Assistance, aimed at giving the state a more active role alongside 
traditional, but clearly insufficient, forms of private or religious charity, went 
beyond the obvious—and in some ways primary—function of rewarding the 
sacrifices made by the nation at arms. The editors of the aforecited commem-
orative volume of 1919 made some unquestionably bold statements about 
the new model of state that seemed to be emerging at the end of the war:
Out of the tragic story of this terrible conflict [....] Italian lawmakers 
have gradually charted a luminous path in which ethical values shine 
brightly and government takes on a more perfect and advanced form. 
The state of law that was considered the most elevated form of state be-
fore the war [...] has suddenly been overtaken and surpassed by the lof-
tiest of concepts: the state of law and social welfare.32
Without drawing any exaggerated conclusions about its lineage, it could 
be useful to point out that the expression stato giuridico sociale (“state 
of law and social welfare,” or “social state of law”) used here in an insti-
tutional context by two ordinary bureaucrats, seems to significantly fore-
shadow certain labels that would appear in the better-known, highly turbu-
29 Diaz was appointed chief of staff of the Italian army after the defeat at Caporetto.
30 Ministero per l’Assistenza Militare, 1919, p. 339.
31 The connection between mass recruitment and the welfare policies that emerged 
from World War I has been pointed out by A. Rasmussen, 2016
32 ibid., p. 26. Italics are in the original. This expression was borrowed from the words 
that Minister of Military Assistance Ugo Da Como used on October 12, 1919 at the Third 
Inter-Allied Conference on Disabled veterans, held in Rome. On that occasion, Da Como 
said: “The new state of law and social welfare, to which all democracies aspire, has grown 
out of the war and replaces the former model, taking human fellowship as its foundation.”
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lent climate of Weimar Germany only in the late 1920s, with the expression 
Sozialer Rechtsstaat, coined by legal scholars such as Hermann Heller and 
Franz Neumann.33 
And so by the end of 1919, bureaucrats at the Ministry of Military 
Assistance were in any case well aware that they were looking at an ob-
vious evolution in the social role of the state, which seemed to mark the 
decline of the traditional, now obsolete Liberal concept of carità legale 
(“legal charities,” private organizations with state oversight) in favor of 
the new “government assistance.” This awareness could also be seen in 
their citation of laws previously passed by the administrations of Franc-
esco Crispi and Giovanni Giolitti, as if to explicitly emphasize the break 
with such perspectives that came about with the foundation of the new 
ministry. While according to Crispi, in 1889, it was the task “of local or-
ganizations, in exceptional cases even with governmental aid, to provide 
for the support of those unable to work,”34 Giolitti took a step forward a 
few years later, in 1904, envisioning a greater—albeit still subsidiary—
role for the state and declaring that “first and foremost, public assist-
ance is a natural obligation of Society, which must provide for it with 
all means at its disposal. Only as a second line of action must the state 
step in, making up for any shortcomings in social assistance.”35 The war 
therefore seemed to have led the government to lay aside the role of co-
star and claim the spotlight in welfare policy. 
2. social insurance, citizenship rights, and the masses
The new social rights did not spring solely from the need to respond 
to and reward the sacrifices of the nation at arms; they were not only a re-
sponse to mass recruitment and the new working-class slant of the mili-
tary. It was the very nature of modern, total warfare that brought the lower 
classes into the life of the nation in a way that could no longer be halted. 
33 Scheuerman, 1994, p. 257. 
34 Francesco Crispi, Report presenting law no. 6144 of June 30, 1889, in Ministero per 
l’Assistenza Militare, 1919, p. 88.
35 Giovanni Giolitti, report presenting law on charities, Law no. 390 of July 18, 1904, 
in Ministero per l’Assistenza Militare 1919, p. 88. The subsidiary role of the state in the 
field of welfare that Giolitti proposed at the turn of the century was in perfect harmony 
with the ideas put forth in the period by the Social Catholic sector; see Tacchi, 2015.
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In a speech before the Chamber of Deputies in the fall of 1917, Treasury 
Minister Nitti acknowledged that the “trenches and fields”—military serv-
ice and agricultural labor—both called for what the statesman tellingly 
terms “full rights of citizenship”:
And those masses of men who, in the trenches and in the fields, 
have most suffered from the war, when they return, will return to in-
voke their full rights of citizenship, and now that they have struck out 
on the great path of history, no one can divert them from it.36
As his biographer has pointed out, Nitti, “who in his cultural back-
ground and outlook nevertheless remained a product of Liberal-era pos-
itivism, was one of the few to quickly grasp the inherent transformative 
power of the war and point out the need to create new tools of analysis 
and planning.”37 The provisions regarding war insurance and assistance, 
which were unquestionably a product of the acceleration triggered by the 
conflict, ushered the lower classes into the world of insurance en masse, 
definitively altering the approaches and theories that had characterized 
debate on these issues up to then. As pointed out in early 1918 by the So-
cialist Rinaldo Rigola, secretary of the Confederazione Generale del Lav-
oro (CGdL – General Confederation of Labor), one important principle of 
insurance in particular—its obligatory nature—became definitively estab-
lished during the war: 
While before the war it was still possible to argue about whether in-
surance should be voluntary or obligatory, such arguments can now be 
considered definitively behind us. Workers and industrialists, statesmen 
and experts on societal health, economists and sanitarians, all agree 
now that insurance must be made obligatory, and be built around three 
36 Atti Parliamentari, Camera dei Deputati, XXIv Legislatura, speech of October 20, 
1917, p. 14792. Georges Clemenceau used basically analogous words in his famous speech 
to the French Parliament upon taking office, exactly one month later: “Ces Français que 
nous fûmes contraints de jeter dans la bataille, ils ont des droits sur nous.”
37 Barbagallo, 1984, p. 240. Nitti had voiced harsh opinions about the inadequate, 
conservative nature of Italy’s social protection policies on more than on occasion in pre-
ceding years. See Nitti, 1953, pp. 419. Already in 1913, as Minister of Agriculture, Indus-
try and Trade (the ministry that coordinated social policies at that time) Nitti had set up a 
special commission to prepare a bill for reforming and developing the outdated social leg-
islation and to include agricolutural workers within the boundaries of the social state. See 
Moses, pp. 179-180. 
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forms of contribution, from workers, employers, and the state. The no-
tion of obligatory insurance has won hands-down.38
The sometimes vehement differences of opinion that had pitted sup-
porters of voluntary insurance against proponents of obligatory insurance 
for decades had melted away upon encountering the new demands im-
posed by the war. In the face of the circumstances, obligatory insurance 
had indeed “won hands-down.”
The first measure in the realm of insurance that marked a definite 
break with the past was introduced by the Boselli administration in Au-
gust 1917; it made accident insurance coverage obligatory for farm work-
ers.39 This initiative not only put agricultural workers in the same posi-
tion as industrial workers by making insurance equally obligatory for 
the former,40 but introduced into Italian welfare law for the first time the 
modern principle that services should be automatic in nature: the right to 
compensation was no longer linked to the contributions paid in (exclu-
sively by the employer) but was automatically triggered by the mere fact 
of belonging to a profession covered by the decree. For the first time, the 
law brought some nine million farm workers into the world of social pro-
tection, making insurance public and obligatory.41 It took over two years 
from the time the degree was issued for it to enter into force, in July 1919. 
While sluggishness and delays in the actual application of the new meas-
ures characterized many of the welfare provisions introduced from 1917 
to 1919 (it was not only necessary to pass implementation laws, but to 
set up entire new bureaucratic and administrative frameworks, often from 
scratch), the lag in application of the laws regarding accident insurance 
for farm workers was due to predictable but forceful opposition from farm 
owners. Meeting in Rome in January 1918, representatives of the comizi 
38 Rigola, 1918, pp. 1. 
39 The first attempt to present legislation in this field was made by Liberal senator 
Emilio Conti in 1907; see Atti Parlamentari, Senato, Legisl. XXII, sess. I, 1904–1907, 
doc. n. 440. In December 1916 a new bill was presented by Liberal MPs Borromeo 
D’Adda, venino and Belotti; this proposal was then incorporated in the bill presented 
to the Senate by the minister of agriculture, industry and trade, Giuseppe De Nava, on 
March 26, 1917. 
40 Already introduced, but only for industrial workers, in 1898.
41 The decree regarded agricultural laborers of both sexes aged nine to seventy-five, 
both permanent and temporary, including “landowners, mezzadri, tenant farmers, their 
wives and children, both natural and legitimate.” 
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agrari (farmers’ assemblies), the chambers of commerce, and agricultural 
associations, along with members of Parliament and individual landown-
ers, drafted a sort of manifesto against the law, well aware that “the de-
cree would have a major impact on relations between workers and own-
ers, both politically and owing to its financial repercussions.”42 The main 
point of conflict was the fact that the implementation law called for a mo-
nopoly on the centralized public management of accident insurance, en-
trusted to the newly founded Cassa Nazionale Infortuni (CNI – National 
Accident Fund).43 During discussion of the regulatory framework, the 
CNI’s monopoly was instead strongly supported by Socialist trade un-
ion representatives such as Argentina Altobelli and Ludovico D’Aragona, 
well aware that employers had total control over the mutual aid societies 
active in the sector.44 Pressure from agriculturalists, which even reached 
the desk of the prime minister,45 did not change the substance of the final 
provision.46 
With regard to accident insurance, it is useful to point out that the 
concept of “professional risk,” which in Italy, too, had served as the ba-
sis for early insurance schemes since the late nineteenth century, was 
transferred and “exported” to the sphere of the new insurance for combat-
ants (the principle of “professional risk” was introduced by the previously 
mentioned war pension reform of October 1918). This testified to the cir-
culation and circular nature of concepts and know-how connected to labor 
law, a connection of which contemporaries were well aware. As noted in 
1919:
42 ACS, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (PCM) 1918, f. 5.1.607.
43 Previously Cassa Nazionale d’Assicurazione per gli infortuni degli operai, founded 
in 1898 to manage only obligatory accident insurance for factory workers. The new CNI 
oversaw the operations of the sixty-nine mutual aid funds that existed at the time, which 
provided accident insurance locally or for specific professions. 
44 The implementation measures (issued as Decree no. 1889 of November 21,1918) 
were drafted by a specially appointed commission at the Ministry of Industry, Trade and 
Labor; see Ministero per l’Industria, il Commercio e Lavoro–Direzione Generale del lav-
oro e della previdenza sociale–Divisione previdenza sociale, 1919.
45 See the pamphlet “Dell’assicurazione obbligatoria per gl’infortuni sul lavoro in ag-
ricoltura” in ACS, PCM 1918, f. 5.1.607, which describes the positions that emerged dur-
ing the meeting of January 1918, as well as a full list of the landowners’ associations and 
individual attendees.
46 Despite pressure from landowners, the Fascist government also preserved state con-
trol over the institutions managing accident insurance, which continued to be headed by 
the CNI.
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The aim of invoking these principles [of professional risk] in the 
field of war pensions as well is to find a point of contact, a link, be-
tween the laws on accident insurance and those on war pensions. There 
can be no question that the two institutions should be seen as overlap-
ping and, in some way, as evolving parallel to each other. As a result, 
progress in a nation’s welfare laws must also necessarily extend to leg-
islation regarding war and the military. And so the theory of profes-
sional risk that has developed in modern welfare legislation must neces-
sarily have a decisive influence on reforms to the war pension system, 
where a parallel theory has taken shape: the idea of combat risk.47 
The exigencies of total mobilization had blurred the boundaries be-
tween soldiers and workers, and injured soldiers “were to be seen as 
workers on the battlefront.” More generally, in those years the very con-
cept of social risk had been transformed and expanded; in Italy, as in 
other countries, the experience of the war “gave way to new understand-
ings about risk as a general social problem.”48 
It was not until the end of the war that the second landmark measure 
regarding social insurance would be passed. In November 1918, just af-
ter the war’s end, the Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce, 
Augusto Ciuffelli, presented the Chamber of Deputies with the adminis-
tration’s “Provvedimenti per l’assicurazione obbligatoria contro la inva-
lidità e vecchiaia” (“Provisions for obligatory insurance against disabil-
ity and old age”).49 In his report illustrating the bill, the minister described 
the less than stellar results that had been achieved in two decades of vol-
untary insurance, since in 1915 only 532,016 workers50 were voluntar-
ily enrolled in the National Insurance Fund, just 3% of the active working 
population.51 As one reads in the minister’s long report, the Italian gov-
ernment had carried out a preparatory phase of in-depth study, taking as 
a model and reference the laws already introduced in this realm in Ger-
many, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Great Britain, Romania, and Swit-
47 Ministero per l’Assistenza Militare, 1919, p. 591.
48 Moses 2018, p. 238 e p. 214.
49 The step that preceded this provision came in April 1917, when registration with the 
Cassa Nazionale di Previdenza per Assicurazione Invalidità e vecchiaia was made obliga-
tory for workers at factories “auxiliary to the war effort.” Up to then, this registration had 
been strictly voluntary even for industrial workers. 
50 INPS, 1962, p. 322. 
51 Percentage calculated based on data from the general census of 1911. See Annali di 
Statistica, 2010, p. 191.
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zerland. Looking beyond its complex technical aspects, the underlying 
political motivations of the government initiative were clearly expressed 
in the minister’s final words: 
Honorable colleagues! The matter presented for parliamentary 
examination with this bill is a weighty one: the questions it raises 
are of an arduous and complex nature. But the purpose is so lofty 
that every human heart must embrace it: fostering a sense of secu-
rity in the souls of workers, protecting the workforce for the ben-
efit of society and families whenever possible, intervening with the 
preventive measures and remedies that experts advise, making sure 
that when productive energies flag due to age or infirmity, there be 
at least the necessary minimum for survival: this is what our ad-
ministration desires, this is what our country now unanimously de-
mands. Other nations, preceding Italy in this arduous initiative, have 
already shown how it is possible to fairly and effectively protect 
workers against disability and age, and now this problem occupies 
our souls and minds as well: today, the time is ripe, and after the 
toil and glory of the great war, with Italy’s awareness of her duties 
to her people having grown, this matter presents itself for the first 
time for analysis by Parliament. So let this legislature, which has led 
Italy on its own natural terms, have the honor of undertaking this 
great task of peace and social justice, ensuring due protection to eld-
erly and disabled workers.52
The labor representatives on the board of the CNP also expressed 
full approval of the project, stating that it even surpassed “the measures 
laid out by foreign legislation in this regard, and the requests formu-
lated by Italian workers before the war.”53 The final days of the Orlando 
administration nevertheless threatened to drag the provision into obliv-
ion, and it was above all due to the prime minister’s pressure on CNP 
leadership54 that the bill was translated into Decree no. 603 of April 21, 
52 Ciuffelli’s report is published in INPS, 1962, p. 319 et seq.
53 Conference of labor representatives on the board of the Cassa Nazionale di Previ-
denza to examine the bill on obligatory disability and old age insurance, Rome, February 
8-10, 1919, in INPS, 1962, p. 189.
54 Regarding this pressure, exercised in the winter of 1919 by Cesare Ferrero di Cam-
biano (president of the Cassa Nazionale di Previdenza since 1904) and by Meuccio Ruini, 
undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor, see ACS, PCM, 1919, 
5.4.313, letters of March 6 and 16, 1919.
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1919.55 The provision opened up the possibility of an old-age pension 
for some twelve million workers, a quantitative and qualitative leap 
of obvious breadth and significance, involving factory and farm work-
ers, including tenant farmers and mezzadri (sharecroppers), but also 
white-collar workers and shopkeepers with low incomes. It thus marked 
the first decisive step toward the creation of a broad, cross-class sys-
tem of collective redistribution, the basis for developing a modern wel-
fare system. It was with some satisfaction, a few months after the bill’s 
passage, that Meuccio Ruini (a member of the Radical Party who was 
then undersecretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Com-
merce), speaking before the High Counsel on Social Insurance,56 which 
had met to prepare implementation measures for the decree, noted how 
much progress the country had made in the field of social insurance in 
two intense years of activity:
Italy has shown great courage in passing this law. To be sure, she 
has risen from last place and now occupies the vanguard for social in-
surance. No other country offers such broad and vast services in this 
field. With the set of provisions already in force for accidents, dis-
ability, and unemployment, to be rounded out only with regard to ill-
ness, we have thus created a full, integral edifice of insurance coverage 
which will grow to be ever more coordinated and unified. The worker’s 
right to social assistance, in all cases, is guaranteed. His old age is safe 
from penury and indigence, he can be certain to receive proper support 
in times of involuntary unemployment, and soon enough, there will also 
be provisions for what most concerns the working classes, that is, aid in 
the event of illness.57
55 Workers became entitled to a pension upon turning sixty-five; the contributions (di-
vided between the worker and employer) were paid by the employer, who detracted the 
worker’s portion from his or her pay; the insurance policy was handled by the Cassa Na-
zionale per le Assicurazioni Sociali (CNAS), the new name of the previous Cassa Nazion-
ale di Previdenza, and its local branches. The state contributed fifty million lire per annum 
to CNAS expenses and 100 lire to the liquidation of each pension. Insurance was obliga-
tory for foreign workers as well, although in their case there was no government contribu-
tion (except for those from countries which had signed bilateral agreements with reciprocal 
provisions for emigrant workers). 
56 An advisory body dealing with labor and insurance established at the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Industry and Trade in 1869.
57 Minutes of the Consiglio Superiore della Previdenza e delle Assicurazioni, meeting 
of December 2, 1919, in INPS, 1962, p. 352.
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Ruini’s call to provide for “what most concerns the working classes,” 
health insurance, nevertheless proved to be the most significant, serious 
gap in welfare coverage with which Italy came out of the war. There were 
plenty of proposals and projects, and they included some of the most am-
bitious and innovative ideas developed during the war. On the very day 
that the provision introducing obligatory accident insurance for agricul-
tural workers was passed, in August 1917, a commission was appointed 
to prepare and present a plan for introducing obligatory health insurance; 
those behind the project clearly realized that accidents and illness were 
connected and complementary, and that a single strategy had to be put 
together to deal with the two issues as an integrated whole.58 The com-
mission, which came to be known as the Abbiate Commission (after its 
leading member, the Liberal Democrat MP Mario Abbiate59), worked 
for over two years on a project that mapped out a sort of national health-
care service ante litteram60: a proto-universalist model—“insurance is to 
be extended to all citizens”61—that would offer broad healthcare cover-
age (medical, surgical, and obstetrical care, and pharmaceuticals) to “all 
workers in the employ of others”: laborers, apprentices, shop boys, home 
workers, domestic staff, tenant farmers and mezzadri, but also white-col-
lar workers and professionals.62 Healthcare and accident insurance, but 
also maternity coverage, would come together in a single insurance plan 
overseen by a single centralized agency, the Cassa Nazionale per le As-
sicurazioni Sociali (National Fund for Social Insurance), which was to 
operate locally through the Social Insurance Institutes. The system was 
funded by joint contributions from workers, employers, and the state, 
with considerable aid from municipalities and local charities, whose func-
58 In this regard, see also the parliamentary discussions of the previous month: Atti 
Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati–Discussioni, session of July 12, 1917, p. 14329 et seq. 
59 Mario Abbiate, the first minister of labor and social insurance, is still a little-known 
figure, but was central to the development of welfare in the first two decades of the twenti-
eth century. See Cassetti, Quaranta, Marucco (et al.), 2015.
60 The commission, which operated under the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and 
Trade, and later the newly founded Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance, left minutes of 
its work; see Ministero dell’Industria, commercio e lavoro–Direzione generale della previ-
denza sociale, 1920; Ministero per il Lavoro e la Previdenza sociale–Direzione generale 
della previdenza sociale, 1921.
61 Ministero per il Lavoro e la Previdenza sociale–Direzione generale della previdenza 
sociale, 1921, p. 205.
62 If their income was under the threshold set by the plan, respectively 350 lire per 
month and 4200 per annum. 
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tions and autonomy (financial and otherwise) were thus profoundly re-
interpreted. The plan would have radically remodeled the fragmented, ir-
regular world of hospitals and healthcare, especially at the local level, and 
more generally, the sphere of public and private charity, which in Italy 
was historically dominated by the vast constellation of Opere Pie, many 
of them owned and operated by the Church.63 During the commission 
meetings, Abbiate himself spoke in defense of the “unified exercise of as-
sistance,” a very innovative principle for the time, which shows the desire 
for reform underlying the initiative and how it radically modernized the 
insurance sector, not only from an organizational and financial standpoint, 
but from a social one as well. While the goals of the reform were ex-
pressed in terms still rooted in the concept of social regulation, its propos-
als were aimed at reformulating the right to assistance, in part as a kind of 
civic and social edification:
There are societal reasons for unifying assistance. This union re-
flects a shift in our spirit, a democratic shift: not all at once, since that 
is not possible, but gradually, every form of charity in human life is 
disappearing to make way for assistance. When we reach the point of 
abolishing all that is charity and transforming it into some form of in-
surance, we will not only have a policy that uplifts our fellow man, 
but will have carried out a great task of public education, because re-
placing charity with insurance is edifying for the masses. And so once 
this financial, societal, beneficial action is achieved, and implemented 
through a vast governmental body, we will have improved not only our 
health, but our society.64
3. a “silent revolution”
The war has silently brought about a great revolution. On the mo-
rrow of this war, we find ourselves in a rather singular position in his-
tory: we find the revolution already carried out and [...] must ask our-
selves if its effects are to be kept in place. This extreme form of state 
intervention, better known under the German name of state socialism, 
63  Farrell-vinay, 1997. 
64 Ministero per il Lavoro e la Previdenza sociale–Direzione generale della previdenza 
sociale, 1921, p. 189. 
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has been put into operation in many countries [...] The phenomenon 
must therefore be studied, to see whether the laws through which it is 
manifested are to be preserved or not. For if the revolution was not the 
result, so far as one can see, of conscious planning, the counter-revolu-
tion at least ought to be. The first principle of any revision or reform is 
to clearly understand and describe the change that has been produced, 
the regime that has been established.65
In this famous inaugural lecture for the 1919-1920 academic year, 
Filippo vassalli, a professor of civil law at the University of Genoa, in-
sightfully grasped the breadth and significance of the changes that the war 
had brought about in the functions and role of the state, even in Italy. In 
the famous scholar’s view, it was a process whose effects could be com-
pared to a full-fledged “revolution,” although vassalli saw it as not al-
ways derived from “conscious planning,” but rather from an almost una-
voidable sequence of events set in motion by the extraordinary nature of 
the war and its demands. 
The results, effects, and problematic aspects of this revolution would 
end up being dealt with above all by the two administrations headed by 
Francesco Saverio Nitti66 and Giovanni Giolitti.67 To date, there has been 
no study of the postwar transition phase that focuses on the impact of the 
new assistance and insurance measures on government institutions, on 
the central and local bureaucratic apparatus, on public opinion, and on or-
ganized interests as a whole. Nor has there been a sufficient exploration 
of possible links between the choices that were made and the rise of Fas-
cism, despite the wealth of studies focused on the Liberal state and the 
rise of Mussolini’s movement.68
It would be pivotally important to find evidence “from below” of to 
what degree veterans, farm workers, factory workers, and white-collar 
workers were aware of possessing these new rights. The fact that the wel-
fare measures introduced during the war were perceived as full-fledged 
rights clearly emerges, for example, from the wording employed as early 
65 vassalli, 1919, p. 1 et seq.
66 June 1919-June 1920.
67 June 1920-June 1921
68 One is reminded of a suggestion made many years ago by Arnaldo Cherubini: 
“Among the factors that gave rise to Fascism, I do not believe one should overlook a sys-
tem of social insurance that was moderate (or rather, “cautious”) yet socialist in inspira-
tion, and all of its political and economic consequences.” Cherubini, 1974, p. 802.
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as October 1918 by the Federazione Italiana delle Società di Mutuo Soc-
corso e delle Cooperative (Italian Federation of Mutual Aid Societies and 
Cooperatives), at a congress jointly organized with the General Confeder-
ation of Labor: 
The working class does not ask, nor does it mean to ask, for obliga-
tory insurance against illness, disability, and old age as a charitable so-
lution to social problems that have heretofore remained unresolved, but 
as an expression of rights which have long been earned, though hereto-
fore in vain, in the harsh and glorious arena of work and social produc-
tion.69 
Millions of citizens, mostly from working-class or peasant back-
grounds, could now legitimately ask government institutions to provide 
compensation for the damages they had incurred and to recognize the new 
rights they now held. For many it was their first experience (not always 
an easy one) of interacting with government offices, but was often marked 
by delays, rejected applications, and unanswered letters. These prob-
lems, but also the unprecedented public awareness of possessing specific 
rights, were highlighted by a column that in July 1916 began to appear in 
Avanti!, the newspaper of the Italian Socialist Party. Titled Questionario 
di guerra (“War Questions”), it guided thousands of readers—enlisted 
men, veterans, and their families—through this “daunting bureaucracy,”70 
helping to explain the complicated administrative procedures they had 
to follow in order to receive the compensation envisioned by law. These 
were “rights, not charity,”71 wrote “Travet Rosso” (Red Travet) —the 
name used by the anonymous columnist72—who by October of 1919 had 
answered some 10,354 questions from people all across the country.
Nevertheless, in the complex transition from war to peace, the first 
victim of demobilization was one of the most significant institutional in-
69 The Congress on Social Insurance, organized by the Federazione Italiana delle Società 
di Mutuo Soccorso e delle Cooperative, in partnership with the Confederazione Generale del 
Lavoro, Turin, October 6–7, 1918, now in INPS, 1962, p. 189. Italics are this author’s.
70 Avanti!, July 16, 1916, p. 2. I would like to thank Giulio Francisci for pointing out 
this reference.
71 Avanti!, July 31, 1916, p. 2.
72 “Travet” comes from the title of an 1863 comedy, Le miserie del Signor Travet, 
“Mister Travet’s miseries”; it became a byword for a punctilious low-level clerk. “Rosso” 
(Red) alludes to the traditional color of the Socialist Party. 
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novations brought about by the conflict, and the primary contact for mil-
lions of veterans and families seeking recognition of their sacrifices and 
injuries: the Ministry of Military Assistance. Not only was the short-lived 
bureau never transformed, as some had hoped, into a broader, more uni-
versal ministry of welfare—although over the course of 1919, this idea 
was floated again by more than one party73—but the institution into which 
the Reformist Socialist Bissoliti had channeled his efforts and which, in 
October 1919, could boast of having provided support to some 7,500,000 
people in just two years of activity,74 was dismantled. This came about by 
order of Prime Minister Nitti in November 191975 (earlier than envisioned 
by the law that established it).76 Military assistance was demoted to the 
more modest rank of a General Directorate, under the guidance and care-
ful financial oversight of the Treasury Ministry. Nitti’s decision to down-
grade the bureau reflected a clash in policy and strategy that had set him 
against Bissolati and his ministry since the previous year. A note from 
Nitti himself, which can be dated to the late summer of 1919,77 shows his 
intention to dissolve the Ministry of Military Assistance, which the new 
prime minister saw as just one of the many unfortunate examples of how 
new government offices had mushroomed, as if by parthenogenesis, as a 
result of the mobilization effort. In his view, rooting out such excesses in 
the state apparatus was essential if he was to efficiently manage the demo-
bilization phase. Yet even more significant, perhaps, was his fear that the 
policies of the Ministry of Military Assistance would foster a pernicious 
73 See the proposal by Mario Pietravalle, 1919, p. 104. The article cited the decisions 
voted on in January 1919 by Section XXIv (Societal Health) and Section XXv (Civil As-
sistance) of the Royal Commission on Postwar Problems, set up by the Orlando admin-
istration on March 21, 1918 to tackle the many sticking points in the transition from war 
to peace. The Royal Commission did its work through subcommissions; Subcommission 
10 (Social Legislation and insurance) known as the Rava Commissione after its chair-
man Senator Luigi Rava, drew up an ambitious program of reforms that were never imple-
mented. See A. Rapini, 2012.
74 Ministero per l’Assistenza Militare, 1919, p. 30. 
75 Decree no. 2200 of November 25, 1919.
76 The decree that founded it specified the temporary, emergency-related nature of the 
ministry, which was to remain in operation only “for the duration of the war, and for one 
year after the declaration of peace.” 
77 ACS, Carte Nitti, b. 12, f. 28. Nitti’s typewritten note is headed “main goals to be 
achieved”; it presents a sort of wish list with regard to a governmental reshuffling that—he 
hoped—would finally lead a “bourgeois” to the head of the War Ministry and involve a di-
rect collaboration with the Socialists after the elections. 
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culture of dependency, barely disguised by a gloss of patriotic rhetoric. 
These concerns, and this attitude, clearly emerged from a speech that Nitti 
gave to the Chamber of Deputies in November 1918:
We have modified the laws on war pensions, giving them greater 
breadth and making up for some shortcomings, but as I warned last 
year, it is above all necessary to avoid creating a dependent popula-
tion.78
Nitti’s vision of reform for the post-war period had a productivist 
slant and called for a parallel overhaul of the state bureaucracy, to create 
an elite of highly skilled public officials. A top-down model of action was 
therefore to be adopted, backed up by an efficient administrative frame-
work. In Nitti’s view, the Opera Nazionale Combattenti (ONC – National 
Institute for Combatants)—which, not coincidentally, was founded in De-
cember 1917, in conjunction with the measure introducing free life insur-
ance for those in the military—was supposed to become the main point 
of contact between veterans and the state, passing on the productivity-
centered impulse that drove his postwar strategy of economic revitaliza-
tion. The ONC would take up the task of putting veterans back to work, 
by training them for new jobs, creating cooperatives, and allotting un-
cultivated land. As one reads in the previously cited celebratory volume 
published by the Ministry of Military Assistance, the ONC was meant to 
combine assistance to veterans with its primary function of “encouraging 
more elevated and fertile economic and social activities.”79 By contrast, 
the Ministry of Military Assistance was seen by Nitti as “a merely quanti-
tative, dependency-centered expansion of government, without any appar-
ent value within the project of reform he had conceived.” The divide “be-
tween the aid-oriented state of the Reformist Socialist Bissolati and the 
production-oriented state of the Liberal Nitti could not have been clearer 
or more unbridgeable,”80 even though the same positivist background 
shaped the outlook and the reform strategies of both men. As some have 
pointed out, at its heart Nitti’s positivism had “an all-engulfing quality, 
convinced as he was that there was only one reality and only one correct 
78 Atti parlamentari, Camera dei deputati, XXIv Legislatura, speech by Francesco Sa-
verio Nitti, December 26, 1918, p. 17670. 
79 Ministero per l’Assistenza Militare, 1919, p. 392. 
80 Quagliaroli, 2018, p. 162.
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way to look at it. And as insightful as he often was in arriving at an inci-
sive analysis of the situations that presented themselves to him, he was, 
on the whole, ill-prepared to understand the different motivations and 
different values that underlay other interpretations, choices, actions, and 
decisions.”81
The downgrading of the Ministry of Military Assistance to a general 
directorate nonetheless ended up creating even worse delays in process-
ing the hundreds of thousands of pension applications (some 913,112 had 
been presented by June 192082), and the problems resulting from what 
was already a chronic scarcity of manpower and resources became ever 
more obvious. Moreover, these problems had existed since the creation of 
the Ministry of Military Assistance in November 1917 and derived from 
the state of emergency in which it was established, since it could not build 
on any solid, preexisting administrative structure. Nitti’s choice to dis-
solve the ministry was therefore not without consequences, in both practi-
cal and symbolic terms: for thousands of veterans and their families, this 
inevitably overworked bureaucracy, full of red tape, was the first barrier 
that seemed to scuttle their newly acquired rights.83
Nevertheless, realizing that veterans’ issues were a strategic element 
in the fragile political and social equilibrium of the post-war period, and 
conscious of their electoral implications, the second Nitti administra-
tion—under pressure from both veterans’ groups and political forces like 
the Socialist Party—returned to the problem of insurance measures for 
former combatants, passing a retroactive extension of the free life insur-
ance policy to include those who had fought between May 24, 1915 and 
December 1917 and up to then had been excluded from the provision.84
The period of the Nitti administration also witnessed the last innova-
tive measure to be passed in the months just after the war: the introduc-
tion of obligatory unemployment insurance, which put Italy at the leading 
edge of European welfare policies. Aside from a British law of 1911 that 
had introduced an early, experimental kind of obligatory unemployment 
81 Barbagallo, 1984, p. 228.
82 Barbagallo, 1984, p. 231
83 Regarding the difficulties that many veterans encountered in trying to obtain a war 
pension, see the many letters and first-hand accounts in Quagliaroli, 2018, pp. 215–250.
84 Decree no. 738 of June 7, 1920. As with other measures, it took a year and a half for 
the implementation law (decree no. 252 of January 22, 1922) to be passed so it could enter 
into force.
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insurance limited to certain categories of workers, and the Soviet laws of 
1917, Italy was the first nation to introduce a large-scale system of obliga-
tory unemployment insurance.85 The Italian laws also came a step ahead 
of the recommendations made by the International Labour Organization at 
its first conference in November 1919.86 
The end of the wartime economy, the slow reconversion of industry, 
and the flood of male citizens returning from the front made mass unem-
ployment the new specter of the postwar period, in Italy and elsewhere. 
At the end of 1919 there were estimated to be about 300,000 people out 
of work in Italy, mostly concentrated in northern and central regions, but 
the real figure was probably much higher.87 In January 1919, the Orlando 
administration passed its first measure aimed at this problem, creating a 
system of monetary support for unemployed workers.88 It was granted to 
factory and farm workers who were unemployed between January and 
December 1919. There were also supplementary benefits for families with 
dependent minors and, in keeping with past regulations, the decree explic-
itly included “irregular families,” that is, households in which a woman 
cohabited with the worker receiving benefits. The measure passed in Jan-
uary was meant to be a temporary stop-gap, but the gravity of the phe-
nomenon required solutions that would tackle the problem in the middle 
to long term. In October 1919 the Nitti administration therefore passed a 
plan for obligatory unemployment insurance—the only example of this 
in Europe at the time—covering industrial and agricultural workers and 
white-collar employees of both sexes, aged fifteen to sixty-five. 89 The 
benefits, whose payment was dependent on the worker’s registration with 
a job placement office, were funded by joint contributions from workers 
and employers, with an annual government contribution of fifty million 
lire. The provision, a radical break with Liberal policies that traditionally 
did little to protect those who lost their jobs, prompted vehement reactions 
from farm owners. They strongly opposed its application, and managed to 
85 Alberti, 2016, p. 74. For a reconstruction of the genesis and first few years of imple-
mentation of this measure, see G. Francisci, 2018.
86 Liebeskind Sauthier, 2013.
87 Employment statistics were based on the number of people registered with job 
placement offices and the number of workers receiving benefit payments, so they were 
partial and patchy, because there were many more placement offices in Northern Italy.
88 Decree no. 6 of January 5, 1919.
89 Decree no. 2214 of October 19, 1919. It did not include domestic workers, civil 
servants, or those who worked from home.
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have the first contributions postponed to July 1920 (for factory owners, 
on the other hand, the date of January 1, 1920 stayed in place). But this 
concession did not dampen the resistance of agriculturalists, who began to 
send pressing demands for the abolition of the measure to the Prime Min-
ister’s office and to the Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance—which 
kept changing hands until 1922, seriously undermining the effectiveness 
of the law.90 
The post-war administrations also found themselves grappling 
with the complicated problem of how to inform possible beneficiaries 
about the new provisions that had been introduced. Most of the provi-
sions that began to be passed in the fall of 1917 entered into force only 
many months later—this was true of the law on accident insurance in 
agriculture, which became operative in May 1919, or the one on ob-
ligatory old age and health insurance, which entered into force in July 
1920. The postwar governments thus also had to deal with this prob-
lem, which was anything but secondary, since the actuarial sustainabil-
ity of the insurance programs was closely tied to the number of people 
participating and the regular payment of contributions. It was neces-
sary to reach out to a population unschooled about the complex techni-
cal aspects of the law—and also unschooled in general, more often than 
not. This was a particularly delicate problem, especially when it came to 
farm workers, who were being ushered for the first time into the world 
of insurance. We can find evidence of this effort, for example, in a cu-
rious booklet published in Bari that began to be distributed in 1920, ti-
tled L’assicurazione invalidità e vecchiaia e i lavoratori della terra: 
Dialogo tra un professore ed alcuni contadini (Disability and Old-Age 
Pensions for Those who Work the Land: Dialogue between a Professor 
and Several Peasant Farmers). Using the traditional but effective ques-
tion-and-answer structure of a catechism lesson, it explained the details 
of the law in simple words, as if speaking to a group of puzzled country 
people. The propaganda and outreach initiative also served obvious po-
litical ends, as we can see from this letter sent to Prime Minister Nitti in 
April 1920: 
90 Regarding the protests of farm owners, see ACS, PCM, 1920, 6.2.166; Archivio 
Storico Confindustria, Serie 0011: Direttore generale: Carte a firma di Giovanni Balella, 
busta 113, fascicolo 341 “Assicurazioni sociali in generale” and busta 120, fascicolo 351 
“Assicurazione contro la disoccupazione.” 
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In order to bring workers closer to the state by helping them see it 
as a friend and protector, to provide comfort to the worthy as part of 
the demobilization effort, and to encourage registration among those 
who are apprehensive or indifferent, it would be very useful to famil-
iarize the population with the great initiative of state-funded worker 
pensions, and with all that is currently being done on behalf of the 
working classes. Spreading these healthy facts and brotherly propa-
ganda would help keep the peace.91
The path to application in the period just after the war proved long 
and difficult for some of the most significant insurance measures that had 
been adopted, revealing the sluggish and awkward way in which Parlia-
ment, returning to work after the long period during the war when it had 
transferred full powers to the administration, tackled the many new is-
sues that had arisen in wartime. One example was the April 1919 decree 
(and its implementation law) that introduced obligatory insurance against 
disability and old age. Presented to the Chamber of Deputies for conver-
sion into law by Labor Ministers Dante Ferraris and Arturo Lariola (re-
spectively on February 5, 1920 and June 25, 1921), the measure never re-
ceived the necessary ratification from Parliament, and was thus in danger 
of becoming inapplicable. This technical problem was eventually settled 
by the Fascist government in 1923.92 
More specifically, one of the questions left to be resolved in the 
postwar transition phase was health insurance, which was made even 
more urgent by the fact that a system of healthcare had already ex-
isted for some time in the new provinces recently annexed by Italy. And 
the virulence with which the “Spanish flu” struck the country from the 
fall of 1918 to the winter of 1919 (Italy had one of the highest mortal-
ity rates in Europe) had only highlighted the failings of healthcare.93 
The Abbiate Commission, entrusted with preparing the reform, pre-
91 ACS, PCM, 1920, f. 6.2.69. It was sent by vittorio Cottafavi, a member of Parlia-
ment in the Liberal-Constitutional group, who came from a rich family of landowners near 
Modena.
92 By passing Decree no. 3184 of December 30, 1923. The implementation law, ap-
proved through the Decree of February 29, 1920, was definitively passed only under Fas-
cism (Decree no. 1422 of August 28, 1924). The decree of August 1917 that made accident 
insurance obligatory met with similar hitches (after various changes it was passed by the 
Fascists as Law no. 473 of April 17, 1925).  
93 Mortara, 1925. 
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sented its conclusions to the Nitti administration in December 1919, af-
ter two years of work. This plan, we are told, was “subjected to merci-
less criticism”94 and set aside before it could even be presented for par-
liamentary examination. Nitti never returned to the problem of health 
insurance, nor did Giolitti after him. Despite continued pressure from 
many sides, above all from labor associations,95 the Abbiate Commis-
sion’s ambitious, innovative proposals remained a dead letter, constitut-
ing the most significant Achilles’ heel of the entire assistance and insur-
ance system that came out of the war. It was a gap that Italy would take 
sixty years to bridge, with the creation of its national healthcare system 
in 1978. Due to the failure of these measures aimed at protecting work-
ers in the event of illness, the project of constructing an integrated, co-
ordinated, global system of social insurance became a mirage. Even by 
the end of 1920, all hope of “global” insurance coverage had vanished,96 
and the institutional and organizational fragmentation of Italy’s welfare 
system would be passed on to the Fascist regime, which would not only 
preserve but accentuate these traits. 
In the final months of the Giolitti administration, one further initia-
tive was nevertheless added to the laws already introduced. Showing sig-
nificant concern for the world of agriculture—and taking into considera-
tion the opinions and suggestions of laborer and tenant farmer groups in 
the discussion stage—the government extended the scope of accident in-
surance for this sector in March 1921, tripling the previous limits of com-
pensation and reducing the percentage of disability necessary to obtain 
it.97 Giolitti’s words at the dissolution of Parliament in April 1921—“it is 
equally important to round out the social insurance program in a more se-
rious, but more streamlined fashion”98—were an invitation to follow up 
on a task still seen as incomplete. 
Although the drive for reform was clearly beginning to peter out, in 
August 1921 Parliament approved an initiative proposed under the last 
94 Cherubini, 1970, p. 801
95 See the requests that the CGDL’s steering committee presented at its National Con-
ference for Social Legislation: INPS., 1962, pp. 196–198.
96 Ferrera, 1993, p. 231. In February 1921, the National Meeting of the Confederazione 
Generale dell’Agricoltura took a strong stance against the “deplorable lumping together” of 
all assistance programs For the meeting resolutions, see INPS, 1962, pp. 193-195.
97 Law no. 297 of March 24, 1921. The certified impairment of the laborer’s ability to 
work that was necessary in order to receive compensation was lowered from 15% to 10%. 
98 INPS, 1962, p. 195.
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Giolitti administration by its labor minister, Socialist Reformist Arturo 
Labriola. Once again, it was aimed at veterans. Introducing for the first 
time a principle into Italian law that one might term “differential inclu-
sion” (based on a system of professional categories that was soon em-
braced and taken to an extreme by Fascism), the provision ensured 
targeted job placement for veterans both in government offices and at pri-
vate companies.99 In October 1917, the Opera Nazionale per gli Invalidi 
di Guerra (ONIG – National Institute for Disabled veterans) was also 
founded, as the state agency tasked with bringing these former combat-
ants back into the life of the nation. The measure introduced by the Italian 
Parliament was perfectly analogous to the Law for the Employment of the 
Severely Disabled passed in Germany in 1920 and the French measures 
introduced between 1916 and 1923100 and thus brought the country into 
line with other European systems of the era.
Under the last three Liberal administrations that succeeded each 
other between July 1921 and October 1922, the crisis in government left 
no room for further reforms. It is therefore particularly surprising to find 
one final, obscure piece of legislation—once again, a decree—that bears 
a curious date: October 27, 1922, five days after the March on Rome. The 
Facta administration, which would remain in office for just a few more 
days (the first Mussolini cabinet was officially formed on October 31), 
passed a measure with far-reaching consequences; it extended the scope 
of disability and old age pensions to cover new beneficiaries compared 
to the law passed in November 1918, including many more white collar 
workers, tenant farmers and mezzadri.101 
99 Law no. 1321 of August 21, 1921.
100 Jackson, 1993; Romien, 2005. There is an extensive literature on veterans in 
other European contexts; see especially Cohen, 2001; Linker, 2011. German law re-
quired every workplace with twenty-five or more employees to hire at least one disa-
bled veteran, and called for at least 2% of the jobs in larger workplaces to be set aside 
for the disabled. The Italian measure required every business with more than ten em-
ployees to hire one disabled veteran for every twenty employees or fractions of ten; the 
same proportion applied to government offices, with greater protective measures, in 
this case, for “impiegati d’ordine” (ordinary clerks) or “subalterni” (low-ranking posi-
tions), where 10% and 20%, respectively, of the total hirees in that category were to be 
disabled. 
101 Decree no. 1479 of October 27, 1922. The decree raised the monthly salary thresh-
old for obligatory old age insurance from 350 to 800 lire. Likewise, for tenant farmers and 
mezzadri, the average annual income threshold was raised from 3,600 to 9,000 lire.
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4. What was passed on?
A recently proposed timeline of key steps in the evolution of the Ital-
ian welfare state singles out the two-year period from 1917 to 1919 as 
the moment that it first came into being. 102 Italy was the European coun-
try in which the index of social benefits grew the most in the five years 
from 1915 to 1920 (22.5%, compared to 7% in the United Kingdom, for 
instance);103 the percentage of state spending allocated to this sphere rose 
from the extremely low figure of 1.56% in 1914 to 6.57% in 1919. Nei-
ther these statistics nor the description of the measures themselves can 
give a full picture of what took place in that period in terms of social pol-
icy. To interpret it properly, quantitative reconstruction must give way 
to a closer analysis of the projects that were carried through and those 
that failed, shifting the focus to the dynamics of clashing interests and to 
the parties involved. One must look more closely at how the new insur-
ance and assistance frameworks that emerged in that period functioned—
from the Cassa Nazionale delle Assicurazioni Sociali, to the ONC and the 
ONIG, on which studies are still lacking.104 It is worth looking at how 
the new laws were applied, both locally and in the dialogue between the 
state’s central and peripheral offices,105 not only to analyze the practical 
working methods of the state’s new welfare services, but to see to what 
degree the local government interventions in the field of welfare that has 
been called “municipal collectivism” could be seen in the Italian context 
as well.106
Nevertheless, in keeping with the notion of a warfare-welfare link, 
one can definitely say that in Italy, too, the Great War triggered an ac-
celeration involving a brief but intense series of reforms, which not only 
brought the country into line with the rest of Europe, but even moved it 
“from a rear guard position to one at the forefront.”107 Certain “univer-
102 Ferrera, Fargion, Jessoula, 2012.
103 Alber, 1983, p. 253.
104 The studies of the Opera Nazionale Invalidi di Guerra (Pavan Della Torre 2015) 
and the Opera Nazionale Combattenti (Barone, 1984) only go up to 1923. These two agen-
cies were respectively shut down in 1976 and 1978, when the national healthcare system 
was created.
105 An excellent reconstruction of the war pension system from this angle is provided 
by Quagliaroli 2018, pp. 
106 Rasmussen, 2016, p. 16. 
107 Ferrera, Fargion, Jessoula, 2012, p. 45.
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salist tendencies” in the expansion of social protection emerged in that 
phase, not only showing up in political and parliamentary debate, but 
taking on concrete legislative and institutional form. The principles un-
derlying the reforms of 1917-1919 therefore helped the country take its 
“first step toward the creation of a single, across-the-board system of 
collective redistribution”108 that would include industrial, agricultural, 
and self-employed workers. Without overlooking the fact that the new 
insurance and assistance measures were harmoniously wedded to self-
serving, repressive aspects of state intervention (which have received 
more attention from scholars), World War I marked the true launch of 
Italian welfare, with “the development of bolder projects for integrat-
ing and governing the masses” and an “attempt to extend the scope of 
reform and assistance initiatives aimed at mediating social conflicts, to 
defuse them or at any rate orient their manifestations and effects.”109 As 
we read in one of the very few historiographic analyses formulated to 
date, it was “a plan of reform that was definitely insufficient compared 
to the real needs of postwar Italy, but nevertheless led to a very impor-
tant series of welfare measures,” fueling “a move to ‘modernize’ gov-
ernment and its relationship with the masses, in a clear break with the 
attitudes of prewar Italy.”110 
The Liberal government thus passed on an updated framework of 
principles and its legislation, especially in the field of social insurance. 
The degree to which the new Fascist administration cared about these is-
sues could be seen from the speed with which it decided to intervene: by 
the end of 1923, it had already made what could be called a small coun-
ter-reform. 
While one can agree with those who say that the basic features of the 
Italian welfare state remained unchanged over the course of the 1920s,111 
the modifications that the new government did introduce stood out for 
having clear political aims that went beyond the mere objective—often 
108 ibid., p. 38.
109 Fava, 1982, p. 184. 
110 Detti, 1984, p. 890.
111 Ferrera, Fargion, Jessoula 2012, p. 41. The only measure adopted in the field of in-
surance was an increase, in 1928, in benefits for dependent children in the calculation of 
old age pensions. In the field of healthcare, obligatory insurance against tuberculosis was 
introduced in 1927. This came at no cost to the state, since it was fully funded by equal 
joint contributions from workers and employers. 
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emphasized in propaganda—of reining in expenditures that had ballooned 
on account of the war. The measures that were adopted made targeted, 
almost surgical amendments to the previous regulations that did not (on 
the surface of things) disrupt the overall system inherited from the Liber-
als; only the elimination of the Ministry of Labor and Social Insurance in 
April 1923 constituted a visible break with the recent past at the institu-
tional level. 
Not coincidentally, landowners—who had been the fiercest op-
ponents of the reforms passed in previous years—were the ones who 
benefited the most from the actions of the new administration, which 
promptly rewarded them for their support during the rise and growth 
of Mussolini’s movement. It was thus the agricultural world that paid 
the highest price when the Fascists took power. In February 1923, the 
degree of disability that farmworkers had to demonstrate in order to 
obtain compensation for work-related injuries was raised from 10% to 
15%.112 This measure also made mezzadri and tenant farmers respon-
sible for paying a portion of the contributions that up to then had been 
entirely covered by their employers. The consequences of this could 
be seen from the radical drop in the contributions that employers were 
asked to pay, which fell by some 43%, according to data from the 
CNI.113 In December 1923, two decrees that were issued on the same 
day turned back the clock for many people working in agriculture.114 
The obligatory disability and old-age insurance that had been intro-
duced in 1919 was eliminated for tenant farmers and mezzadri, putting 
them back in the situation they were in before the war. The changes to 
unemployment insurance, a provision that landowners had always stri-
dently opposed, were even more drastic. As early as November 1922, 
the Fascist administration allowed them to suspend payment of insur-
ance contributions for all employees. At the end of 1923, when the 
yearly state contribution to unemployment insurance was suspended, 
never to be reintroduced in the years that followed, the government 
exempted all farm workers from insurance obligations (they were also 
eliminated for domestic staff and home workers, who still made up a 
112 Decree no. 432 of February 11, 1923. This decree also reduced the age range of the 
workers entitled to compensation, limiting it to those aged twelve to sixty-five (it had pre-
viously been from nine to seventy-five).
113 Cassa Nazionale per gli Infortuni sul lavoro, 1925, p. 113.
114 Decree no. 3158 of December 30, 1923; Decree no. 3184 of December 30, 1923. 
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considerable portion of the workforce, especially among women). The 
most innovative feature of the Italian laws, which were the first in the 
world to envision unemployment insurance even for farm workers, 
was erased.115 
The new administration also took advantage of the gaps left by the 
previous reforms. And so the plan for health insurance, which the last 
Liberal governments had already put on the back burner, was definitively 
dropped, and management of this fundamental sector of welfare policy 
was handed off to traditional charity organizations or, in the case of in-
dustrial workers, to a plethora of mutual aid funds, mostly organized at 
the individual company level.116 The system of mutual funds was favo-
rably viewed by Catholics, since maintaining the traditional approach to 
healthcare allowed Catholic charities to preserve the role they had always 
played in society (delegating assistance to the Catholic Church gave it 
solid, lasting hegemony in this strategic sector). But it was also encour-
aged and supported by the Fascists, because it seemed to concretely em-
body the concept of class-based collaboration that was at the heart of their 
ideology and corporatist rhetoric. 
The basic features of the legislation that redesigned the insurance sys-
tem in 1923 were never updated by the regime in the years that followed. 
Not coincidentally, it would take another world war for Fascist leaders to 
reconsider their approach. 
archivos y fuentes primarias impresas
Acs, Carte Nitti, b. 12, f. 28; b. 19, f. 49
Acs, PCM, 1918, f. 5.1.607
Acs, PCM, 1919, 5.4.313
Acs, PCM, 1920, f. 6.2.69; f. 6.2.166
Archivio storico conFindustriA, Serie 0011 Direttore generale, b. 113, f. n.341 
“Assicurazioni sociali in generale”; b. 120, f. n.351 “Assicurazione contro la 
disoccupazione”
115 But even for the categories of workers that continued to draw unemployment insur-
ance, the sums were quite low, given that from 1919 to 1935 the per-diem amount never 
changed; see Ferrera, Fargion, Jessoula, 2012, p. 55. 
116 No studies currently exist of the history of mutual funds in the Fascist era; see De 
Grazia 1981.
868 Historia Contemporánea, 2019, 61, 835-872
Ilaria Pavan
ministero per il lAvoro e lA previdenzA sociAle–direzione GenerAle dellA 
previdenzA sociAle, L’assicurazione obbligatoria contro le malattie. Atti 
della Commissione incaricata della preparazione di uno schema di disegno 
di legge. Parte i: Studi preparatori, relazioni, schemi di progetti di legge, 
Roma, 1920
ministero per il lAvoro e lA previdenzA sociAle–direzione GenerAle dellA 
previdenzA sociAle, L’assicurazione obbligatoria contro le malattie. Atti 
della Commissione incaricata della preparazione di uno schema di disegno 
di legge. Parte ii: Verbali delle adunanze della Commissione e della Sotto-
commissione, Roma, 1921
ministero per l’industriA, il Commercio ed il lavoro, Direzione generale del 
lavoro e della previdenza sociale, divisione previdenza sociale, Assicu-
razione obbligatoria contro gli infortuni sul lavoro in agricoltura – Atti 
della Commissione incaricata di predisporre lo schema di regolamento, 
Roma, 1919 
ministero per l’AssistenzA militAre e le pensioni di GuerrA, L’assistenza di 
guerra in italia, Società Anonima Poligrafica Italiana, Roma, 1919
cAssA nAzionAle per Gli inFortuni sul lAvoro, i primi sei anni dell’assicu-
razione obbligatoria contro gli infortuni in agricoltura nella gestione della 
Cassa Nazionale infortuni, Roma, 1925,
bibliography 
AlBer, Jens, «L’espansione del welfare state in Europa occidentale: 1900-1975», 
Rivista italiana di Scienza Politica, 1983 (13), 2, p. 220
AlBerti, Manfredi, Senza lavoro. La disoccupazione in italia dall’unità a oggi, 
Laterza, Roma-Bari 2016
BArBAGAllo, Federico, Francesco Saverio Nitti, Utet, Torino, 1984
BArone, Giuseppe, «Statalismo e riformismo: L’Opera Nazionale Combattenti 
(1917-1923)», Studi Storici 1984, 25, no. 1, pp. 203–244
BrAcco, Barbara, La patria ferita, Giunti, Firenze 2012
cAssetti, Maurizio, quArAntA, Flavio, mArucco, Dora (et all.), Mario Abbiate. 
Le intuizioni oltre il suo tempo, Nuova Trauben Edizioni, Torino, 2015
cAstles, Francis G., «Black Swans and Elephants on the Move: The Impact of 
Emergencies on the Welfare State», Journal of European Social Policy, 20, 
2010, pp. 91-101
cermenAti, Mario, «Intorno alle pensioni di guerra. Appunti, considerazioni e 
notizie varie», Nuova Antologia, 1918 (1° dicembre), p. 289-294
cheruBini, Arnaldo, «Una pagina molto nota e poco conosciuta: lo schema del 
disegno di legge sull’assicurazione obbligatoria di malattia del dicembre 
1919», La Rivista italiana di Previdenza Sociale, 1970, n. 5, pp. 798-802
https://doi.org/10.1387/hc.20281 869
War and the Welfare State: The Case of Italy, from WWI to Fascism
cohen, Daniel, The War Come Home. Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 
1914-1939, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles-Londra, 2001
crocellA, Carlo, mAzzonis, Filippo, L’inchiesta parlamentare sulle spese di 
guerra (1920-1923), vol. i, Saggi; vol. ii, Documenti: Storia della Com-
missione; vol. iii, Documenti: Settori dell’inchiesta, Archivio Storico della 
Camera dei Deputati, Roma, 2002.
dA como, Ugo, Discorso pronunciato da S.E. ugo Da Como, ministro per 
l’Assistenza militare e le pensioni di guerra, in Campidoglio, Società ano-
mia poligrafia italiana, Roma, 1919
de GrAziA, victoria, The Culture of Consent: Mass Organisation of Leisure in 
Fascist italy, Cambridge University Press, 1981
detti, Tommaso, Stato, guerra e tubercolosi (1915-1922), in Malattia e medi-
cina, Della Peruta, Franco (ed.), Annali Einaudi, 7, Einaudi, Torino 1984
FArrell-vinAy, Giovanna, Povertà e politica nell’Ottocento. Le opere pie nello 
Stato liberale, Paravia, Torino, 1997
FAvA, Andrea, «Assistenza e propaganda nel regime di guerra (1915-1918)» in 
isnenGhi, Mario (ed.), Operai e contadini nella grande guerra, Il Mulino, 
Bologna, 1982
FerrerA, Maurizio, FArGion, valeria, jessoulA, Matteo, Alle radici del welfare 
all’italiana. Origini e sviluppo di un modello sociale squilibrato, Marsilio, 
venezia, 2012
FerrerA, Maurizio, verGAllo Luigi, «Guerra e politiche sociali: il caso ital-
iano e un primo confronto con quello tedesco», Società e storia, 159, 2018, 
pp. 181-203
FerrerA, Maurizio, «Italy: wars, political extramism, and the constrains to wel-
fare reform», in, oBinGer, Herbert, petersen, Klaus, stArke Peter, Warfare 
and Welfare. Military Conflict and Welfare State Development in Western 
Countries, Oxford Up, Oxford, 2018, pp. 99-126
FrAncisci, Giulio, «L’assicurazione obbligatoria contro la disoccupazione in Ita-
lia. Dalla Grande Guerra alla carta del lavoro», in Studi Storici, 2, 2018, 
pp. 367-401.
GAl, John, «The Puzzling Warfare-Welfare Nexus», War & Society, 1, 2007, 
pp. 99-102
inps, Per una storia della previdenza sociale in italia. Studi e documenti, Roma, 
1962
jAckson, Christopher R., «Infirmative action: the Law of the Severely Disabled 
in Germany», Central European History, 1993, 26, n. 4, pp. 417-55. 
klAusen, Jytte, War and Welfare. Europe and the united States, 1945 to the 
present, Palgrave, London 1998
kohler, Peter A., et al. (eds),The Evolution of Social insurance 1881-1981: 
Studies of Germany, France, Great Britain, Austria and Switzerland, Lon-
don-New York, F. Pinter-St. Martin’s Press, 1982 
870 Historia Contemporánea, 2019, 61, 835-872
Ilaria Pavan
lABAncA, Nicola (ed.), Guerra e disabilità. Mutilati e invalidi italiani e disabi-
lità, Unicopli, Paodva 2016
lieBeskind sAuthier, I., «Modern Unemployment: From the Creation of the 
Concept to the International Labour Office’s First Standards» in kott, sAn-
drine, droux (ed.), J., Globalizing Social Rights - The international Labour 
Organization and Beyond, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 67-84
linker, Beth, War’s waste. Rehabilitation in World War i America, Chicago-
Londra, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2011
luzzAti, Enrico, Portesi Roberto, La spesa pubblica, in Cassese, Sabino, 
L’amministrazione centrale, UTET, 1984, Torino.
mAsinA, Filippo, «Il collocamento obbligatorio dei reduci di guerra. Il caso ita-
liano nel contesto internazionale del secondo dopoguerra, 1945-1946», ita-
lia Contemporanea, 2018, 288, pp. 39-71
mortArA, Giorgio, La salute pubblica in italia durante e dopo la guerra, Bari, 
Laterza, 1925 
moses, Julia, The first modern risk. Workplace accidents and the Origins of Eu-
ropean Social states, Cambridge UP, Cambridge 2018
nitti, Francesco Saverio, La legislazione sociale in italia [1892], ora in Scritti 
sulla questione meridionale, vol. I, 1958, Bari.
oBinGer, Herbert, petersen, Klaus, «Mass Warfare and the Welfare State–
Causal Mechanisms and Effects», British Journal of Political Science, 1, 
2017, pp. 203-27
oBinGer, Herbert, petersen, Klaus, stArke, Peter, Warfare and Welfare. Mili-
tary Conflict and Welfare State Development in Western Countries, Oxford 
Up, Oxford, 2018
pAvAn dellA torre, Ugo, «Entre public et privé: l’assistance aux invalides 
de guerre et les origines d’un nouveau système de welfare en Italie (1915-
1923). Notes et perspectives de recherches», in Revue d’histoire de la pro-
tection sociale, 8, 2016, pp. 45-64
pietrAvAlle, Michele, «Per un ministero della Sanità ed Assistenza pubblica in 
Italia», Nuova Antologia, gennaio-aprile 1919, pp. 104-117
pironti, Pierluigi, «Grande guerra e Stato sociale in Italia. Assistenza a invalidi e 
superstiti e sviluppo della legislazione sulle pensioni di guerra», italia con-
temporanea, 207, 2105, pp. 63–89 
procAcci, Giovanna, Warfare –welfare. intervento dello Stato e diritti dei citta-
dini (1914–1918), Carocci, Roma, 2013
quAGliAroli, Fabiano, «Le pensioni per gli invalidi della Prima guerra mon-
diale», Contemporanea, 1, 2016, pp. 43–67
quAGliAroli, Fabiano, Risarcire la nazione in armi. il Ministero per l’Assistenza 
Militare e le Pensioni di guerra (1917-1923), Unicopli, Padova 2018
rApini, Andrea, «Attori, spazi e saperi della riforma sociale in Italia attorno alla 
Grande Guerra», Passato e Presente, 2016, 99, pp. 59-86
https://doi.org/10.1387/hc.20281 871
War and the Welfare State: The Case of Italy, from WWI to Fascism
rApini, Andrea, «Il discorso politico di L. R.: lavoro, democrazia, riforma so-
ciale», in Momenti del welfare in italia. Storiografia e percorsi di ricerca, a 
cura di P. mAtterA, Roma 2012, pp. 17-53
rAsmussen, Anna, «Protéger la société de la guerre: de l’assistance aux ‘droits 
sur la nation’», in Guerre et protection sociale, Revue d’histoire de la pro-
tection sociale, 9, 2016, p. 8-22
riGolA, Rinaldo, «Le classi operaie e le assicurazioni sociali», Rassegna Sociale. 
Rivista mensile della Cassa Nazionale d’Assicurazione per gli infortuni de-
gli operai sul lavoro, 5, 1918, n. 1
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